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Recent Decisions

CONSTITUTIONAL

LAW-EQUAL
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Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania has held that a school board regulation
requiring teachers to resign at the end of their fifth month of pregnancy
BOARD

TERMINATION

OF

PROFESSIONAL

EMPLOYEE-The

is reasonable and thus valid under a state statute.
Cerra v. East Stroudsburg Area School District, 3 Pa. Comm. Ct. 665,
285 A.2d 206 (1971).
Defendant school district adopted a regulation requiring pregnant
teachers to resign, effective not later than the end of the fifth month of
pregnancy.' Previously, the district had followed the common practice
of granting maternity leaves in such cases, but administrative difficulties
caused by the failure of some teachers to return to active duty as ex2
pected prompted the board to alter its maternity policy.

The plaintiff teacher refused to tender her resignation as required
and was dismissed. Her requests for re-instatement were denied by the
school board, the Commonwealth Secretary of Education, and the
Court of Common Pleas of Monroe County. The plaintiff appealed to
3
the commonwealth court which upheld the dismissal.
Under section 5-510 of the School Code, 4 Pennsylvania school districts are vested with specific statutory authority to promulgate "reasonable rules and regulations" regarding the conduct of teachers and
students, and other administrative affairs. Although litigation involving this statutory basis is not extensive, several decisions have held that
a teacher may be dismissed for violation of a "reasonable" school board
regulation.
1. 3 Pa. Comm. Ct. 665, 285 A.2d 206 (1971). The resolution adopted by the school
board reads: "Resolved that henceforth maternity leaves of absence shall not be granted
to employees of this school district; that any employee who becomes pregnant shall
resign effective not later than the end of the fifth month of pregnancy .
Id. at 673,
285 A.2d at 209.
2. Id. at 668, 285 A.2d at 207. The school superintendant and the elementary principal testified as to their experiences with the maternity leave policy. In one year four
teachers who were expected to return notified the board within a week before the beginning of the school term that they had decided to quit.
3. The commonwealth court took jurisdiction pursuant to section 402(3) of the Appellate Court Jurisdiction Act, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, § 211.402(3) (Supp. 1972). This provision allows for appeal to the commonwealth court in cases which involve a ruling of a
state administrative agency.
4. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 5-510 (1962):
The Board of School Directors in any School District may adopt and enforce such
reasonable rules and regulations as it may deem necessary and proper, regarding
the management of its school affairs and the conduct and deportment of all superintendants, teachers, and other appointees or employees during the time they are
engaged in their duties to the district ....
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In the Sinton Case5 the superior court upheld the dismissal of a
teacher after finding "reasonable" a regulation requiring all teachers
to reside in the school district.6 Similarly, Pennsylvania courts have
sustained dismissals caused by teachers' refusals to accept coaching as
a part of assigned duties,7 to attend an "open house," and to accept a
mandatory maternity leave.9
Any dismissal of a tenured teacher'0 in Pennsylvania must, however,
find a justification under the Teachers' Tenure Act of 193911 which
limits the grounds which a local board may use to terminate the contract of a professional employee. In the instant case the plaintiff was
dismissed for "persistent and wilful violations of the school laws,"' 12
because she refused to resign in compliance with the board's regulation.
Since the school board has only the power to make "reasonable" regulations, a teacher who was dismissed for violating ultra vires regulation would be entitled to re-instatement.
The plaintiff in Cerra argued before the commonwealth court that
the school district is not authorized to require resignation through its
own regulation since the legislature has set forth the only valid causes
for termination.' 3 The plaintiff further asserted that pregnancy is an
"illness" and since state statutes require school boards to grant leaves
in cases of illness, 14 it is discriminatory and unreasonable for the
defendant board to treat pregnancy in a special manner.' 5 Finally, the
5. 154 Pa. Super. 233, 35 A.2d 542 (1943).
6. Id. at 235, 35 A.2d at 543. See also Jones v. Kulpmont Borough School Dist., 333 Pa.
581, 3 A.2d 914 (1939).
7. Ganaposki's Appeal, 332 Pa. 550, 2 A.2d 742 (1938).
8. Johnson v. United Dist. Joint School Bd., 201 Pa. Super. 375, 191 A.2d 897 (1963).
9. Ambridge Borough School Dist. v. Snyder, 346 Pa. 103, 29 A.2d 34 (1942).
10. A teacher is granted tenure after satisfactory completion of two years of service
in the school district. After attaining this status the teacher may be dismissed only "for
cause." PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 11-1121 (1962). Mrs. Cerra was a tenured teacher.
11. Id. In relevant part, the statute reads: "The only valid causes for termination of a
contract hereafter or heretofore entered into with a professional employee shall be immorality, incompetancy, intemperance, cruelty, persistent negligence, mental derangement,
persistent and willful violation of the school laws of this Commonwealth on the part of the
professional employee .... "
12. Brief for Appellant at 7, Cerra v. East Stroudsburg Area School Dist., Civil No.
359 (Pa., filed Jan. 19, 1973).
13. The doctrine of state pre-emption provides for the supremacy of state law over
local regulations and ordinances when the state has evidenced an intention to fully
occupy a particular area of law. When the state is found to have enacted a comprehensive plan for regulation of a certain subject, all local regulations which are inconsistent
with the state plan are invalid. See Harris-Walsh, Inc. v. Dickson City Borough, 420 Pa.
259, 216 A.2d 329 (1966); Western Pa. Restaurant Ass'n v. Pittsburgh, 366 Pa. 374, 77 A.2d
616 (1951); Girard Trust Co. v. Philadelphia, 336 Pa. 433, 9 A.2d 883 (1939); Dalzell, The
State Pre-Emption Doctrine: Lessons From the Pennsylvania Experience, 33 U. Prr. L.
REV. 205 (1971).
14. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, §§ 11-1153, -1154 (1962).
15. 3 Pa. Comm. Ct. at 667, 285 A.2d at 207.
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plaintiff argued that the maternity regulation is violative of the equal
protection clause of the fourteenth amendment to the United States
Constitution. 16 After noting the absence of any Pennsylvania cases holding that pregnancy is to be considered an "illness," the majority restricted itself to a bare consideration of whether the board's regulation
is "reasonable" within the purview of section 5-510.17 In doing so, the
court relied upon two thirty-year-old Pennsylvania precedents dealing
with maternity regulation in quite different contexts.
In Brown's Case's the school district had no formal maternity regulation, but successfully dismissed a pregnant dental hygienist on the
ground of "incompetency."' 19 The board claimed the plaintiff was
physically incapacitated as a result of her pregnancy and was unable to
discharge her duties adequately. The superior court held that such a
physical disability could qualify as "incompetency" 20 and upheld the
dismissal solely on this ground. 21 There was no determination of the
"reasonableness" of any local regulation since the school board had no
formal maternity policy.
22
In Ambridge Borough School District'sBoard of Directorsv. Snyder
the court upheld a dismissal based upon a pregnant teacher's refusal
to accept a mandatory maternity leave. The school board in Ambridge
had a regulation requiring such leaves. The plaintiff had obtained a
sabbatical leave "for the purpose of health" and during this time gave
birth to a child. Upon learning of the pregnancy the board ordered the
plaintiff to convert her paid sabbatical into an unpaid maternity leave.
The plaintiff refused. The Ambridge court held that such a refusal
constitutes "persistent and wilful violation of the school law" and war23
rants dismissal under the Teacher's Tenure Act.

The Ambridge majority did not explicitly consider the "reasonableness" of the leave requirement. Rather, the opinion was pre-occupied
16. Brief for Appellant at 14, Cerra v. East Stroudsburg Area School Dist., Civil No.
359 (Pa., filed Jan. 19, 1973).
17. Id. at 7. The Secretary of Education dismissed the charge of "incompetency"
against appellant.
18. 151 Pa. Super. 522, 30 A.2d 726, aff'd per curiam, 347 Pa. 418, 32 A.2d 565, cert.
denied, 320 U.S. 782 (1943).
19. Id. at 528, 30 A.2d at 729.
20. Id. at 526, 30 A.2d at 728.
21. Id. at 528, 30 A.2d at 729. The court said: "We must bear in mind that Mrs. Brown
was not being discriminated against because of her marriage which occurred long prior
to the events we have recited. Her dismissal was due neither to that fact nor to her
legitimate pregnancy, but because she became incompetent due to her physical incapacity
to discharge her duties."
22. 346 Pa. 103, 29 A.2d 34 (1942).
23. Id. at 108, 29 A.2d at 38; see PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 11-1122 (1962).
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with the plaintiff's contention that her sabbatical leave granted im.
munity from the board's regulatory power.
The question of the "reasonableness" of a regulation requiring
pregnant teachers to resign is one of first impression in Pennsylvania,
although the Cerra court was apparently satisfied that the factually
divergent Ambridge and Brown decisions provided an adequate basis
for the Cerra holding. 24 Perhaps of greater importance is the constitutional issue raised by the appellant Mrs. Cerra, 25 which was ignored by
the majority but dealt with extensively in a dissenting opinion by
Judge Kramer. 26 In Cerrathe appellant asserted that the board's regulation was arbitrary and unreasonable (in the constitutional sense) 27 and
thus violative of the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amend28
ment.
Within the last two years federal courts in five circuits have dealt
with the constitutionality of state maternity rules requiring leaves of
absence.2 9 In each case, the constitutional issue raised by the plaintiff
teacher was similar to that found in Cerra.
In Le Fleur v. Cleveland Board of Education,0 the Court of Appeals
for the Sixth Circuit reversed a district court decision holding a man24. In Williams v. San Francisco Unified School Dist., 340 F. Supp. 438 (N.D. Cal.
1972), the district court struck down a maternity leave requirement and noted that the
majority opinion in Cerra represented a "cursory analysis" which "does not commend
itself to this court." Id. at 448. This comment may indicate the federal court's disapproval of the commonwealth court's failure to deal with the plaintiff's constitutional
argument.

25. Brief for Appellant at 14, Cerra v. East Stroudsburg School Dist., Civil no. 359
(Pa. filed Jan. 19, 1973); see U.S. CONsr. amend. XIV, § 1.
26. Cerra v. East Stroudsburg Area School Dist., 3 Pa. Comm. Ct. 665, 676, 285 A.2d
206, 210 (1971). Judge Kramer concluded that the rule requiring resignation instead of
leave was unduly harsh. He also implied that the regulation was too broad and inflexible,
since there was no proof offered that the district suffered inconvenience from all pregnant
teachers, or from the plaintiff. He analogized the situation to marriage: "The marriage
of a school teacher is an analogous situation creating problems for school boards. If a
substantial percentage resign to become housewives, should we then permit a school
district to terminate a teacher's position four months before her marriage? I certainly
would not, and I believe that the command of the Equal Protection Clause forbids it."
Id. at 676, 285 A.2d at 210.
27. Two questions of "reasonableness" are raised in the instant case. On the one hand
the school board regulation is valid under state law only if it is "reasonable." On the
other hand, the fourteenth amendment forbids "unreasonable" discrimination. Might the
applicable standards be the same in each case?
28. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
29. Bravo v. Board of Educ., 345 F. Supp. 155 (N.D. Ill. 1972); Williams v. San Francisco
Unified School Dist., 340 F. Supp. 438 (N.D. Cal. 1972); Schattman v. Texas State Employment Comm'n, 330 F. Supp. 328 (W.D. Tex. 1971), rev'd, 459 F.2d 32 (5th Cir. 1972);
Le Fleur v. Cleveland Bd. of Educ., 326 F. Supp. 1208 (N.D. Ohio 1971), rev'd, 465 F.2d
1184 (6th Cir. 1972); Cohen v. Chesterfield County School Bd., 326 F. Supp. 1159 (E.D. Va.
1971), aff'd, 467 F.2d 262 (4th Cir. 1972).
.30. 465 F.2d 1184 (6th Cir. 1972).
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datory leave requirement constitutional.8 1 The Le Fleur court, pointing out that the recent Supreme Court decision in Reed v. Reed"2
established that a classification (with resulting different treatment)
based inherently upon sex is violative of the fourteenth amendment,
held that the Cleveland board's regulation was likewise invalid. 3 The
court noted further that any physical disability (including flu and the
common cold) results in some administrative inconvenience and the
board's singling out of one particular disability for such special treatment is arbitrary and unreasonable, and thus violative of the fourteenth
4
amendment's equal protection clause.
Cohen v. Chesterfield County School Board35 is in accord with Le
Fleur on the conclusion that mere administrative inconvenience is not
a sufficient reason for overriding the protective provisions of the fourteenth amendment 8 6 In affirming a district court decision in favor of
the teacher, the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit concluded in
Cohen that the discrimination inherent in the maternity leave requirement is not justified by either of the two established equal protection
tests.8

Neither the strict "compelling state interest" test 88 (used in the

area of "constitutionally suspect activity") nor the more tolerant "rational basis" test8 9 (used generally in the area of social and economic
40
regulation) was found to justify the leave requirement.
The United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois
in Bravo v. Board of Education4' applied the lenient "rational basis"
test and found no reasonable relationship between the Chicago board's
rule and any valid objective of the board. 42 The Bravo court dismissed
31. 326 F. Supp. 1208 (N.D. Ohio 1971).
32. 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
33. 465 F.2d 1188 (6th Cir. 1972).
34. Id. at 1187.
35. 467 F.2d 262 (4th Cir. 1972).
36. Id. at 265.
37. Id.
38. When state law treats a class of persons or property through special provisions
and the basis for the classification is "constitutionally suspect" (for example, based upon
race) or when a basic constitutional freedom is restrained or denied, the fourteenth
amendment has been interpreted to require a showing of a "compelling state interest"
in the regulation. See Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 634 (1969); Sherbert v. Verner,
374 U.S. 398, 406 (1963); Bater v. Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516, 524 (1959).
39. When the classification inherent in a state law does not involve "constitutionally
suspect" activity, the plaintiff challenging on equal protection grounds must show that
the regulation in question does not bear a reasonable relationship to a valid governmental purpose. See Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 484-85 (1969); Morey v. Doud,
354 U.S. 457, 464 (1967); Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415 (1920).
40. 467 F.2d 262 (4th Cir. 1972).
41. 345 F. Supp. 155 (N.D. Ill.
1972).
42. Id. at 159.
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almost without discussion the board's assertion that administrative inconvenience provided a "rational basis" for the leave requirement, and
went on to note that there is no convincing medical evidence establish.
ing that teaching beyond the fifth month of pregnancy presents any
4
special danger to the teacher's health.
Conversely, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
in Schattman v. Texas State Employment Commission" reversed a district court decision and held a maternity leave requirement to be reasonably related to a valid state objective. 45 The Schattman court relied

in part on medical testimony describing various physiological phenomena accompanying pregnancy which could prove inconvenient to
the employer.

46

More litigation on the validity of maternity regulations seems likely.
In addition to the fourteenth amendment cases discussed above, recent
congressional action has opened two new avenues to teachers who want
to challenge such rules. Within the past year Congress has amended
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 196447 to bring states and state
agencies within the coverage of the Act's employment discrimination
provisions. 4 8 None of the plaintiffs in the federal cases mentioned above
were able to establish a violation of Title VII because of the original
law's explicit exclusion of state employers from coverage. 49 Congress
has also recently approved the proposed "women's rights amendment"
to the Constitution, 50 which, if approved by the states, will undoubtedly
lead to extensive interpretative litigation in the area of sex discrimination. For the present, however, challenges of maternity regulations
seem to be developing along fourteenth amendment lines.
Running through the reported federal cases and Cerra is a common
43. Id. at 158.
44. 459 F.2d 32 (5th Cir. 1972).
45. Id. at 41.
46. Id. at 39-40.
47. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-h (1970) [hereinafter referred to as Title VIII.
48. Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1970), as amended, Pub. L. No. 92-261, § 2
(U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 814 (Supp. Apr. 20, 1972)).
49. In Schattman v. Texas State Employment Comm'n, 330 F. Supp. 328 (W.D. Tex.
1971), rev'd, 459 F.2d 32 (5th Cir. 1972), the plaintiff unsuccessfully argued that the
Texas State Employment Commission was an "employment agency" and thus governed by
special provisions of Title VII.
50. Proposed Constitutional Amendment, U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 833 (Supp.
Apr. 20, 1972):
Section 1. Equality of Rights under the law shall not be abridged or denied by the
United States or any state on account of sex. Sec. 2. The Congress shall have the
power to enforce by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article. Sec. 3.
This amendment shall take effect two years after the date of ratification.
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thread of argument by the defendant school authorities. One of the
principal "rational bases" advanced in the federal cases, and the Cerra
defendant's sole reason for its regulation, is the administrative inconvenience (or hardship) caused by deciding on a case-by-case basis when
to release pregnant teachers. In addition to the fact that such individualized procedure would involve more work for the school boards, the
defendants in Le Fleur,51 Cohen,52 and Cerra53 protested that the continuity of the educational process would be jeopardized by individual
determinations.
With regard to the increased workload, the Le Fleur court noted that
"procedure by presumption" is always easy, but not always justified."
This objection would seem especially poignant when, as in Le Fleur
and Cerra, all teacher disabilities are not treated alike (for example, illness leaves are commonly granted for several months' duration) even
though the administrative inconveniences are similar or identical.
The "continuity of education" portion of the administrative hardship
argument has not been dealt with squarely in the federal cases. Cohen
defers to Le Fleur,5 5 and neither Le Fleur nor Bravo deal with the issue
in much detail.
Cerra challenges the constitutionality of a permanent termination of
the pregnant teacher's employment and thus involves a much harsher
rule than those considered in the federal cases reported above. This
factual distinction places the administrative inconvenience argument
in Cerra in a somewhat different context and would seem to foreclose the school district's use of any justification other than its past
51. 455 F.2d at 1187.
52. 467 F.2d at 264.
53. 3 Pa. Comm. Ct. at 668, 285 A.2d at 207.
54. 455 F.2d at 1187. In Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972), the Supreme Court
held that a state statutory scheme for child custody which impliedly presumed that all
unwed fathers were unfit to act as parents for their own children was violative of the
due process and equal protection clauses of the fourteenth amendment. The Le Fleur
court quoted Mr. Justice White's majority opinion from Stanley:
Procedure by presumption is always cheaper and easier than individualized determination. But when, as here, the procedure forecloses the determinative issues of
competence and care, when it explicitly disdains present realities in deference to
past formalities, it needlessly risks running roughshod over important interests of
both parent and child. It therefore cannot stand.
Indeed, one might fairly say of the Bill of Rights in general, and the due process
clause in particular, that they were designed to protect the fragile values of a vulnerable citizenry from the overbearing concern for efficiency and efficacy which may
characterize praiseworthy government officials no less, and perhaps more, than mediocre ones.
405 U.S. at 656. See also Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
55. 467 F.2d at 265.
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experiences with some teachers who failed to return from maternity
leaves of absence.
Cerra is presently on appeal to the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.5 6
Hopefully, that court will deal with the constitutional issue squarely,
if the necessity arises, and add a convincing precedent from a state tribunal to the developing case law in the area of maternity regulations.
Although the commonwealth court by-passed the equal protection issue
raised by the case, the recent activity in the federal courts indicates a
strong likelihood that the East Stroudsburg regulation, and others like
it, may ultimately stand or fall on this question.
Richard William Perhacs
AUTHOR'S NOTE: On January 19, 1973, the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania filed its opinion in Cerra v. East Stroudsburg Area School
District. The court reversed in favor of the appellant teacher. The unanimous opinion, delivered by Justice Eagen, failed to reach the constitutional issue raised by the case. However, the court cited Le Fleur
and Cohen and recommended that the reader compare them with the
instant case.
In deciding Cerra, the court regarded the central issue as the "legality" of the board's action in terminating appellant's contract. The court
thus took a broad view of the possible infirmity of the Board's resolution and moved beyond a mere consideration of whether the regulation
was "unreasonable" or ultra vires under section 5-5 10 of the School
Code. The decision was largely based on the sex discrimination provisions of the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43,
§ 955(a) (1964). The applicability of this statute was proposed by appellant's counsel but not emphasized.
Justice Eagen characterized the board's regulation as "sex discrimination pure and simple." Interestingly, and, as might be expected, the
court used language which would have been appropriate in disposing
of the case on equal protection grounds. After noting that there was
no evidence that appellant's ability would be impaired after the pregnancy, the court pointed out that (1) male teachers are not so harshly
treated in East Stroudsburg and (2) pregnant women are singled out
and placed in a class to their disadvantage. In answer to the "adminis56. Cerra v. East Stroudsburg Area School Dist., 3 Pa. Comm. Ct. 665, 285 A.2d 206
(1971), was argued before the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania at Philadelphia on November 13, 1972. The decision in favor of appellant was filed on January 19, 1973.'
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